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Vol. I] JANUARY, 1914 [No.2 
GERMAN ROMANTICISM 
Welch ein Unfug I Welch Geschrei I 
GOETHE: Faust. 
The German romantic movement was the result of defective 
culture, of bodily and mental derangement, of spiritual and 
nervous disorder. It is a work of degeneration, deformation, and 
disease. And it bears on its front the stigmata of its infirmities-
absurdity, folly, inanity, and confusion. There is Hardenberg, 
the pattern of the school, who falls in love with a chit of thirteen 
and at her death a year or so later dedicates himself to the grave, 
an unblemished sacrifice of love, unblighted by sickness, violence, 
or sorrow, the cheerful victim of his own regret. In the mean-
while he begins a new era and dates his note-books from the 
epoch of her decease. By the end of the following twelvemonth, 
however, he has sufficiently vaporised his emotions in various 
scribblings to choose another bride and is reduced to faking 
metaphysical nonsense to pass off an infidelity which would never 
have been cast up against him but for his own extravagant pro-
testations. Sophie and Julie are two, such is his magic arithmetic, 
only in the land of phenomena; in the land of fulfilment, where 
all differences are reconciled, they are but one. There again is 
Friedrich Schlegel, grubber of ideas for the whole party, pro-
claiming in sublime paradox that formlessness is the highest form 
of art; the fragment, the consummate genre of literature; the 
dissolution of poetic illusion, the signet of poetic genius. Pro-
phet of transcendental buffoonery and irony, of Freiheit and 
Willkilr, he has ended his days in the service of the two narrowest 
Autoritatsprincipien that ever were, Austrian imperialism and 
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Roman Catholicism. There is Tieck too, after an education littfe 
better than an emotional and intellectual debauch, writing dramas 
backwards and demonstrating the identity of poetry and music 
by "transposing" notes into words: 
" Die Farbe klingt, die FOliTI ertont." 
There is Schleiermacher, the priest, the Geistlicher, preaching 
free love and the "emancipation of woman," making himself, 
in W alzel's words, "the forerunner of the modem French novel, " 
the gospel of lubricity and license. And finally there are poor 
H6lderlin and Wackenroder, the one crack-brained at thirty or 
thereabouts, the other fretted out at twenty-five between his duty 
and his inclinations. Nor are their friends and lovers much 
better. On the whole they are pretty much of a piece with 
Dorothea Veit, the daughter of Moses Mendelssohn, who deserts 
her husband and two children to run after Friedrich Schlegel, 
and Caroline Michaelis-Dame Lucifer, Schiller called her-
Bohmer's widow, Gallic agitator, inmate of a German prison, 
mother of a nameless child, who accepts Friedrich's brother, 
Wilhelm, as a pis aller and under his nose carnes on a liaison 
with Schelling, for whom she finally leaves her husband. 
I 
But enough of personalities. The thoroughly significant thing 
about German romanticism as a literary phenomenon is its 
sterility. It has almost no works, literally next to nothing to 
show for itself in the way of literature. A little vapid verse, 
two or three staggering dramas, a few rickety M iirchen and 
twaddling rhapsodies, several dilapidated novels, or rather ro-
mances, to sustain the claims of a school that pretended to derive 
from the Roman-this is just about all its literary capital, the 
greater part of it unreadable, inexpressibly childish, silly, and dull. 
In itself it were all equally harmless, though for different reasons, 
because all equally ineffectual. If there is something almost 
disarming about the naivete which could seriously busy itself 
with a performance like Heinrich von Ofterdingen, the preposterous 
crudity and flatulence of a Sternbald is no less disabling. Both 
were alike negligible, had it not been for the impudence of their 
exploiters. Indeed, as a general thing the illustrators of the 
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movement were not in the first instance responsible; they were 
merely let in for it. In its inception the school consisted virtually 
of a pair of doctrinaires and theorists-Wilhelm Schlegel, dilet-
tante and eclectic, and his brother, Friedrich, pedant and mauvais 
tete-who attempted to create a criticism a priori and who, 
impotent to illustrate it themselves, were forced to have recourse 
to what they were able to pick up elsewhere. After a fashion 
it resembled those institutions which are universities in name 
but in fact are nothing but examining boards. It criticised the 
productions of others, and if pleased therewith, graduated them 
romantic. It lived on foreign conquest and annexation, and made 
capital of the fruit of other men's labours. In such wise it 
cannily took possession of Tieck, who was at bottom an inde-
pendent man of letters, a free lance, even a journalist in the 
sense that with him literature was before all a business and a 
livelihood. In a word Tieck was too much of a Dryden to be a 
romanticist by vocation. The significant thing about him is that 
he outgrew his romanticism, which in his case was only a malady 
of adolescence, a distemper or kind of green sickness. It was 
merely one of hi~ manners and no mote permanent or final than 
that which marked his period of "enlightenment. " 
In particular, however, romanticism found its most advanta-
geous affair in the inadvertencies and indiscretions of acknow-
ledged genius. So it laid· hands upon certain work of Schiller's 
and Goethe's, and insisted upon making them romantic leaders 
in spite of their protests. To be sure, Goethe was in some sense 
romantic and not wholly irresponsible for many of the positions 
his name was used to cover. But the capital fact of his life, 
after all, was his conversion from romanticism, even after his own 
kind, which was at worst of quite another complexion than that 
of the school's. What importance he himself attached to this 
change of colours, is shown by the circumstance that he is con-
stantly preoccupied with it during the latter part of his life-
endlessly affirming, explaining, justifying, and commenting it. 
Unfortunately, however, for a just perception of the facts it is the 
romantic Goethe with whom we are better acquainted, partly 
on account of the currency which he himself has given his earlier 
years in Dichtung und Wahrheit and partly on account of the 
assiduity with which the romanticists have continued painting 
his portrait after their own likeness. But for all the seduction 
of his youth and the apotheosis it has received, the significance 
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of his manhood, of his intellectual being, should not be overlooked 
-and that was irreconcilably at odds with the romantic error. 
And yet it must be acknowledged in the same breath that what-
ever his principles, Goethe was always inclined to coquette with 
romanticism more than was good for him. Personally I fail 
to see much choice, as literature, between the second part of 
Faust and Tieck's Prinz Zerbino. As a system of philosophy, 
metaphysics, or Symbolik the former may be vastly superior; 
that is a question to be decided by those who understand it. 
But at all events it was by no means difficult for the romanticists 
to find in him excuse or precedent for some of their worst follies. 
So it was in particular with the gigantic egotism which underlay 
their pretensions to artistic vocation. There is something almost 
bete in the complacency and open-mouthed stupefaction with 
which Goethe--and even Schiller, who had less reason for it-
contemplate their own productions, as though they were some 
great and inevitable work of nature, to say nothing of the exag-
gerated respect which they have for their own occupation. And 
while perhaps the frequent fatuity of the romanticists was less 
innocent as it was less excusable, they might have pointed to this 
common trait among others as a plausible evidence of kinship. 
Nevertheless the lesson to be drawn from the careers of Goethe 
and Tieck as a whole is perfectly obvious. The notions of the 
romantic school are, in the most favourable interpretation, those 
of youth and immaturity; it is impossible for any sane man to 
grow old, not to say ripe, in them. Their very begetters aban-
doned them in later life--or rather, the other way about, their 
ideas abandoned them, and they went out one after another like 
draughty candles. Even the two Schlegels became, the one a 
functionary of authority and tradition, the other a literary 
cicisbeo or factotum. In short, there is .about romanticism 
nothing permanent or achieved. It is not a state of attainment 
in which it is possible to rest content, as Goethe rested in his 
classicism. It is not even a stage of development; it is a mood, 
an aberration of spirit, to which youth, together with periods of 
dissolution and transition, is particularly liable. 
No wonder, then, that the existence of German romanticism 
was parasitic; it lacked the constitution to live independently 
and relied upon other sources for its sustenance and support. 
Hence in part its mischievousness. I t deranged the intellectual 
economy and impaired the moral health of the whole age and its 
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posterity by disturbing the natural circulation of ideas and stim-
ulating a set of abnormal and artificial appetites and reactions. 
The ideas which it appropriated, the work which it approved, were 
~eldom their authors' best or sanest. To be sure, there was at the 
time little enough that was excellent to choose from; still of 
what there was it failed to take the best. Or if by any chance it 
did, the reasons for its choice, as well as the use it made of its 
selections, were anything but judicious. Naturally its acquisi-
tions were exceptional and accidental when considered with 
reference to the entire work of the author from whom they were 
extracted; and since they formed no ensemble of themselves, 
they were as frequently inconsistent and incongruous one with 
another. In this way arose endless difficulties-multiplied 
explanations, reconciliations, compromises, adjustments, extenua-
tions-and in general an impression of confusion and incon-
sequence about the whole ingeniously tessellated fabric. This is 
the explanation too of that inextricable mixture of truth and false-
hood in the romantic doctrine by which so much that is erroneous 
has succeeded in passing current in the past until our criticism 
and appreciation are honeycombed with it and by which the 
wariest critic is liable to be disconcerted still. 
Upon this confusion it was inevitable that the intellectual 
sterility peculiar to the movement should react disastrously. 
As a matter of fact, the two characters are hardly separable, and 
it would be difficult to say whether the romantic confusion is 
a result of literary impotence or vice versa. It is merely a case 
of action and reaction. Inasmuch as its promoters had few 
ideas of their own, they were thriftily disposed to make these 
ideas go as far as possible by applying them to all sorts of subjects 
indiscriminately. So Friedrich Schlegel transferred to current 
criticism the principles he had originally derived from the study 
of Greek. He judges Wilhelm Meister by the same criteria as 
the Iliad and the Odyssey and arrives, as might be expected, at 
an insanely jumbled estimate of both. Nor did the school, 
under his able tuition and that of his brother, proceed otherwise 
with such general subjects as art, nature, religion, and philosophy, 
as though to justify Schleiermacher's saying, "Es gehort zu dem 
sich noch immer weiter bildenden Gegensatz der neuen Zeit gegen 
die alte, dass nirgend mehr einer eines ist, sondern jeder alles." 
So little sense had they of the just measure that they seldom 
touched an idea without spraining it. They broke up wholes 
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into parts and erected parts into wholes. They isolated single 
factors and treated them as complete in themselves. They 
mistook means for ends and ends for means. They added and 
subtracted unlike denominations to make a desired product. 
They slurred distinctions and ignored resemblances. They 
invented such hybrids as the" religion of art" and the" religion 
of nature, " terms which they took literally, not metaphorically. 
" Any man is a priest, " says Schleiermacher, "who under a form 
original and complete has developed in himself, to the point of 
virtuosity, the faculty of feeling in any mode of representation. " 
With Schelling they turned poetry into philosophy and with 
Novalis they turned religion into poetry. For the latter, indeed, 
the gospels derive their authority chiefly from the fact that they 
have to do with the dissolution of a spell (Verzauberung) and hence 
resemble a Miirchen or fairy tale, the favourite romantic genre. 
In a word, confusion-chaos they themselves define as the roman-
tic element-is, with futility, the constant character of the 
movement, and our present universal deformation of ideas is 
but an heirloom of the school. 
Capital, in particular, for its critical temper is the crass 
eclecticism with which it sought to run the arts together, into a 
kind of indiscriminate medley, without regard for their natural 
differences of aim, effect, material, and method. With the 
phenomenon itself we are only too well acquainted nowadays 
when our critics are still discoursing as though the Laokoon had 
never been written while our poets are industriously creating 
pastels in prose and symphonies in verse, to say nothing of the 
painters' marvels in tone and the musicians' miracles of colour. 
But appalling as it is to observe how quickly a distinction once 
achieved may be totally obliterated, it is not we in this case who 
are the first offenders. Friedrich Schlegel, N ovalis, Tieck, and 
"many more whose names on earth are dark "-they are all with 
one accord for the promiscuity of art. "Hence it is desirable 
to bring the arts together again and to seek transitions from one 
to the others. In this wise statues may rouse into paintings, 
paintings become poems, poems music, and who knows what 
noble church music will mount once more like a temple into the 
air! " So the elder Schlegel; and to much the same effect N ovalis : 
" In general it is impossible for the poets to learn enough from the 
musicians and painters. . . . They should be more poetic 
and as who should say more musical and picturesque." While 
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the younger Schlegel in his own very best manner raises dis-
traction to its highest power: "Romantic poetry is a progres-
sive universal poetry. Its mission is not merely to unite all the 
sep~rate varieties of poetry and to reconcile poetry with philo-
sophy and rhetoric; it will and must also now blend, now fuse 
poetry and prose, genius and criticism, art-poetry and nature-
poetry." As for Tieck, it must be acknowledged, he is by no 
means so universal a spirit; he is merely an advocate for the 
poetry of music and the music of poetry: "What! is it not per-
missible to think in tones and to make music in words and 
thoughts? " 
In all these quotations, it should be noticed, the word poetry 
has come to have a meaning so vague, shifty, and ambiguous 
as to be incapable of supporting any conclusion-or what amounts 
to the same thing, as to be capable of supporting any conclusion 
whatever, an advantage which Wilhelm Schlegel finally pushes 
home in his Berlin lectures on belles-lettres and art by substituting 
the term "poetics" for the "theory of art" (K unstlehre) in 
general. 
All this has a very familiar ring. It is quite in our own way-
so much so as to seem rather trite and hardly worth consideration 
save for the sake of its genealogy. But then, which of the roman-
ticists' errors is likely to appear novel in the eyes of their heirs? 
At the same time I maybe pardoned in the interests of complete-
ness for calling attention to still another obsession and that the 
most striking and significant of all. I mean that which at bottom 
a disciple of Freud's might be disposed to think responsible for 
the whole romantic neurosis. To be sure,. there is ever a dis-
position at periods of ecstatic agitation to confound love erotic 
with love charitable. But in this instance the symptom is 
particularly important because what seems to result from a 
study of the romantic doctrine of passion, is the suspicion that a 
great part of the disorder of the school was the result of nothing 
more or less than sexual unrest. The manner in which this 
sensual ground of uneasiness appears and reappears at frequent 
intervals, like a shoal under ruffled water, is startling .. How much 
of Nova1is' piety is due to the loss of his Sophie it is hard to say; 
but its kind orjquality is unmistakable-it bears the marks of a 
thwarted or perverted desire, a momentary vacancy of the senses. 
In his own words, "the exaltation of the beloved object to a 
divinity is applied religion." And equally characteristic of the 
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confusion between Eros and Charity is the jotting in his note-
book, "Christus und Sophie." But it is Schleiermacher in his 
Reden ilber die Religion who puts the official and theological 
seal upon this notion that" die Losung alter Riitsel im Geheimnis 
der Liebe liege." 
" For him who stands alone the all exists in vain, for in order to take up 
into himself the life of the Universal Spirit (Weltgeist) and to have religion, 
man must first have discovered mankind, and that he :finds only in love and 
through love. For this reason are the two things so intimately joined; long-
ing for love, ever fulfilled and ever renewed, comes at once to constitute for 
him religion. . . . Therefore religion withdraws into the still more con-
fidential intercourse of friendship and the dialogue of love, wherein face 
and figure are plainer than words and even a sacred silence is intelligible." 
With these tenets it is hardly astonishing that the promoters of 
the movement should be, on the whole, so little edifying in their 
relations with the sex. One and all they were dominated not by 
women but by woman. The gallantry of Wilhelm Schlegel is no-
torious. For the riotousness of Friedrich his Lucinde is sufficient 
evidence, not to mention his early letters to his brother. But why 
multiply examples? The lubricity of Ardinghello seems to have 
awakened a response in every one of them, even Tieck. And 
not only this, which might be paralleled in more robust natures; 
about all their love affairs there is invariably something morbid 
and uncanny. Caroline was eleven years older than Schelling; 
she was thirty-five and he was twenty-four, when he first fell in 
love with her. Sophie von Kuhn was a mere child of twelve or 
thirteen when betrothed to Hardenberg. I have already spoken 
of Wilhelm Schlegel's inglorious conquest of Bohmer's widow after 
her experience in Mainz and her political incarceration. He 
seems too to have borne with exemplary equanimity her infatu-
ation for Schelling, which took place under his very nose, and to 
have accommodated himself to the liaison with a complaisance 
in no wise short of ignominious. Even after Dorothea's divorce 
from Veit, Friedrich Schlegel insists upon keeping up the irregu-
larity of their relationship as long as possible in sheer delight 
apparently in his own depravity. Characteristic too is the well-
known passage of his Lucinde in celebration of the transposition 
of the masculine and feminine r6les in love. Schleiermacher 
himself must needs fall in love with a married woman to begin 
with and finally marry the widow of a friend. But something 
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in which they saw their own figures a thousand times repeated 
and of colossal dimensions. " M ich fuhrt alles in mich selbst 
zuruck," confesses N ovaHs. Or if it failed to admit their pre-
tensions to magnitude, they shut their eyes to it and denied its 
competence altogether: 
"Ich komme nur mir selbst entgegen 
In einer leeren W ustenei. " 
As a matter of fact they had all been spoiled in the nursery, 
and spoiled children most of them remained all their lives. The 
work with which they won a hearing was almost uniformly unfit 
for publication; in France it would never have got into print 
at all. It was only the abject poverty of German letters at the 
time which allowed them to pose as writers, and precocious ones 
at that. Tieck's origins are incredibly crude and mawkish. 
Friedrich Schlegel's first critical efforts are execrably written and 
composed, and reek of intellectual coxcombry and pretension. 
Novalis is jejune and silly. The blest of them all is Wilhelm 
Schlegel, and he is commonplace and foppish. But finding 
themselves indulged in their whimsicalities and mannerisms, and 
flattered by their ability to dumbfound the respectable Philistine, 
the Nicolais, and other A ufkliirer of the day, they had no incentive 
to correct themselves and clarify the ferment of their youth. 
And particularly so, since there was no authority capable of 
impressing or overawing them. For a graphic picture of the 
spiritual conditions at the time as they appeared even to the 
romanticists themselves, whose very element was confusion, 
I can do no better than quote Schleiermacher: 
"It is a time," he says, "when nothing human remains unshaken; when 
every one sees just that which determines his place in the world and secures 
him to the earthly order, on the point, not only of escaping him and falling into 
another's possession, but even of perishing in the universal maelstrom; when 
some not only spare no exertion of their own powers but also call for help on 
every side in order to keep fast what they consider the axes of the world and 
of society, of art and of science, which are by an indescribable fatality upheav-
ing as though of themselves from their deepest foundations and are leaving to 
destruction what has revolved about them for so long; when others with rest-
less impetuosity are busy in clearing away the ruins of fallen centuries in order 
to be among the first to settle upon the fruitful soil which is forming under-
neath out of the rapidly cooling lava from the frightful volcano; when every 
one, even without leaving his own place, is so greatly agitated by the violent 
convulsions of the universe that amid the generai vertigo he must needs 
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rejoice to see a single object steadily enough to hold by it and gradually be 
able to persuade himself that there is something still standing." 
Amid the universal trepidation Goethe and Schiller alone 
exercised some sort of steadying influence. But even Goethe 
and Schiller, as I have already remarked, were not invariably 
level-headed. And by the time the youngsters might have 
profited by their better example the mischief was done; they 
were confirmed in their folly to the point of resenting criticism 
and admonition. They quarrelled with Schiller and even with 
Goethe, and consorted only with those like-minded with them-
selves, "Bruder im Geiste. " From their early corruption, there-
fore, they never recovered. If they were not thwart and perverse 
from the start, they soon became so under the process of delib-
erate self-cockering and mutual admiration which was the breath 
of their life .. 
Psychologically their leading motive was egotism. From this 
one characteristic it would be possible to derive pretty nearly 
their whole activity. "Das Ich soU sein." The self was their 
favourite, their exclusive pursuit; Selbst-beobachtung, their darling 
study. It is with utter rapture that Schleiermacher describes 
the glorious moment when he first discovered his I, unique and 
unmatchable--like Childe Roland's dark tower, "without a 
counterpart in the whole world "-and recognised it for the 
foundation of all morality and religion. Eminently representa-
tive too is the letter written to her husband by Rahel Vamhagen, 
their disciple, when the cholera was raging in Berlin: "What I 
want is a death of my own. I won't die of an epidemic like 
a blade of grass in a field, parched by malaria among its com-
panions. I will die alone of my own disease--that's the kind of 
woman I am." 
As a result the whole history of their ideas is individual; it 
is a part of their biography, not of the history of thought. In 
this sense it is almost physiological, like their figures or their 
faces. In spite of the liberty about which they were always 
prating, they lay themselves under the very worst of tyrannies-
the tyranny of self. Their intellectual and moral life was as 
completely subdued to the accidents of their own persons as was 
their digestion or bodily health. Their mental and ethical tone 
was as exposed to the weaknesses and disorders of their own 
temperaments and as helpless before them as was their physical 
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tone to the weaknesses and disorders of their constitutions. 
Tieck had romanticism just as he had rheumatism-as passively 
and as unintentionally-however much he may have brooded 
over it when he once came down with it. So it was that they 
never succeeded in abstracting their thought-there is nothing uni-
versal or even general, impartial, and inevitable about their ideas. 
In no respect, perhaps, is their egotism more strikingly shown 
than in their attitude toward literature and art in general. As 
litterateurs, ergo artists, at least in intention, they were so deeply 
immersed in their own profession as to be incapable of seeing 
anything else. Not only was it the one serious concern of life, 
it was also the standard or norm of all other concerns whatever. 
Even in Goethe the importance attached to resthetics strikes us 
nowadays as rather naive, if not actually silly-at all events as 
beside the mark. The kind of artistry which runs through 
Wilhelm Meister as the sole preoccupation of every character of 
any account and which indeed is the one touchstone of character, 
is quite in the romantic vein and belongs to the same order of 
things as the Sternbaldisieren with which Goethe himself re-
proaches Tieck. But though Goethe may have given a kind of 
currency to the idea, it was reserved for the romanticists proper 
to complete the confusion between art and morality, between the 
conception of life as an accomplishment and as a duty. As for 
so many other of our vices we are indebted to them too for the 
disposition to "literatise" and "articise" life. Indeed, so far 
did they carry the practice, so impotent were they to think out-
side of their own categories, so inflated with their own assumption 
that they must needs make existence a play and God an artist 
also because they, forsooth, were themselves second-rate literary 
men. Even Schelling is so carried away with the draught created 
by these ideas as to place resthetics above morals, to find the 
consummation of philosophy in a work of art, and to justify 
metaphysically the conception, which is represented even by 
Schiller and Goethe, that the only complete man is the poet-
" die Poesie das Hochste und Letzte sei. " Heaven forfend! What 
a world this would be if all of us were artists! But with this 
conception, at all events, the distinction between philosophy and 
poetry, between art and life is wiped out at one stroke; and 
reality and fancy mingle in graceful phantasmagoria. ,. Was wir 
Natur nennen ist ein Gedicht, das in geheimer, wunderbarer Schrift 
verschlossen liegt. " 
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Subdued as they were to the spell of their own being, they never 
discovered in all their aspirations after freedom that the only 
liberty is the liberty of self-restraint. They failed to perceive 
that life was constantly spreading its snares to involve them in a 
coil of fatal consequences, in a chain of determinations where their 
independence would be irretrievably lost and they themselves 
would become but creatures and slaves of circumstance. Frie-
drich Schlegel's Lucinde is to all intents and purposes a panegyric 
of sexual passion-or of love, as he preferred to call it. Its 
thesis, as far as it can be said to have such a thing, consists with 
the conviction that the realisation of liberty, of the infinite, das 
Unendliche, is possible through the unbridled gratification of this 
appetite alone. With pitiable short-sightedness he seems never 
to have reflected that the moment he yielded to his passions, he 
had become enmeshed in a network of influences over which he 
had no control whatever, that he had committed himself to the 
conditioned and given hostages to fortune. Only by an act of 
self-control and denial, only by standing aloof and refraining 
would it be possible to affirm his ego in withdrawing it from the 
consequences of its activity. 
"Von der Gewalt, die aIle Wesen bindet, 
Befreit der Mensch sieh, der sieh uberwindet." 
But consequences was the last thing they thought of; they were 
totally devoid of discipline. And when they philosophised, they 
were merely trying to talk themselves into believing what they 
wished. Their freedom was the freedom to do as they liked; 
their liberty, the liberty to indulge their own caprices. 
Whether the romanticists consciously recognised the dis-
crepancy between their profession of liberty and their actual 
subjugation to self, it would be hard to say. In any case their 
whole dialectic was directed to the problem of reconciling just 
these two different notions; though it was only by a kind of 
sophistry, in invalidating the authority of achieved distinctions, 
that they succeeded in doing so. By obliterating the line of 
demarcation between the outer and the inner order and reducing 
the former to a tributary of the latter, by such means alone was it 
possible to make it appear as though the gratification of impulse, 
which makes man the slave of circumstance, was after all only 
a sort of self-determinism. It was for this reason that they 
welcomed with enthusiasm the philosophy of Fichte, which jus-
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tified their existence in representing the universe as the creation 
of a glorified and transcendental ego. No doubt Fichteanism 
was in the air, and it was of these cobwebs that Fichte spun it. 
But it was as symptomatic of romanticism as acceptable to it. 
For this reason their a tti tude toward nature becomes extremely 
interesting. It was to nature that they resorted in the first 
instance because her passivity had no embarrassments for their 
self-esteem. They sought to her as they did to those of similar 
mind with themselves. With her they could be themselves, 
unrebuked and unabashed. They were rid of the clash of wills, 
of the constraint of human intercourse, of the elementary decency 
which compels even the most obstinate and wilful in society to 
have some small regard for the rights of others, if for no better' 
reason than a fear of the unpleasant consequences which result 
from neglecting them. Before nature they could flaunt their 
own personality as arrogantly as they pleased. Above all, they 
might have of her the supreme satisfaction which the egotist 
finds in the conviction that his influence is irresistible; they could 
make her over in their own image so that she should bear their 
very seal and impress. That they never saw her as she is-
passionless, irrational, meaningless, a pure illusion-is clear 
from their account of her. They saw her only as they were; 
they discovered in her only what they brought to her. It is 
after their example that we have learned to identify the moral 
and the natural world. Cramped as they were by their own 
limitations, they were incapable of conceiving another order 
distinct and remote from that with which their own consciousness 
acquainted them. Like N ovaHs they took nature to be the 
"systematic index or plan of our spirit" just as we ourselves 
are" Analogien-quellefiir das Weltall." And in that consciousness 
of theirs they found little that was not sentimental. They had 
no principles, no criticism-hardly a purpose; they were moved 
by accident and caprice. Such is the sense of every word they 
wrote. Heinrich von Ofterdingen falls in love with Mathilde 
because he happens to feel, on seeing her, as he did in a dream 
on seeing the little blue flower. It is circumstance alone which 
determines them in one direction rather than another-cir-
cumstance and mood. And as they were themselves, so they 
thought of nature-as of something equally moody, capricious, 
and passionate. "Das grosse Weltgemiith" Novalis calls her. 
It was a later and different tum of romantic thought which by 
GERMAN ROMANTICISM III 
an analogous error made her out a being essentially intellectual, 
while by an inevitable reversal of the original confusion it is man 
who has become a creature of nature's, a natural product. instead 
of nature's being an achievement of consciousness, a sentimental 
creation, a gigantic K unststilck or transcendental tour de force-
or in N ovalis' words, "ein Universaltropus des Geistes. " 
The volte-face is noteworthy. But after all the two attitudes 
are only counterparts and are in reality so represented by Schell-
ing, who finally gave a philosophical organisation to all these 
indefinite ideas that were crossing in the air. "It is our view of 
nature," he says, "not that it accidentally coincides with the laws 
of consciousness . . . but that it necessarily and originally 
realises as well as expresses those laws, and that it is nature and 
is called so only in as far as it does this." It follows that" the 
system of nature is at the same time the system of consciousness" ; 
that" nature is visible mind and mind invisible nature. " While, 
further, "nature thus appears as the counterpart of consciousness, 
which consciousness itself produces in order to return thereby 
to pure self-intuition or self-consciousness." "Hence in every-
thing organic there is something symbolic, every plant bears some 
feature of the soul." And he ends by transferring the whole 
scheme of consciousness to external nature,using his metaphysical 
principles to fill in the gaps in the positive knowledge of the 
physical universe which existed in his day, exactly as Novalis 
advises in the Lehrlinge zu Sais: "The careful description of the 
history of this inner world of consciousness is the true history of 
nature; through the consistency of the world of thought in itself 
and its harmony with the universe is formed of itself a system of 
ideas for the accurate representation and formulation of the 
universe. " 
At this point the confusion has culminated in the complete 
identification of the law for man and the law for thing. Such is 
the fallacy of the romantic conception of nature past and present: 
with Schelling it offers man as the measure of nature, or else 
with Renan it offers nature as the measure of man. How much 
clearer, or at least how much less prejudicial is the Greek idea of 
nature as of something in itself indifferent or inert, as a decoration 
or accessory of voluntary action or a machine which it requires 
intelligence to move! It is responsible for the whole marvellous 
Greek mythology. Between the modem and his landscape there 
ever swims a haze-the fume of his own distempered imagination. 
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"Die W esen sind, well wir sie dachten. 
1m truben Schimmer liegt die Welt, 
Es fallt in ihre dunkeln Schachte 
Ein Schimmer, den wir mit uns brachten. " 
With Tieck he is like a man in a trance, a somnambulist in a limbo 
between night and morning: 
"It often happens that the world with all its tenants and occasions reels 
before my eyes like a flimsy phantasmagoria. And I too seem but an 
accompanying phantom, which comes and goes and comports itself amaz-
ingly without knowing why. The streets look to me like rows of mimic 
houses filled with silly occupants, who simulate human beings; and the 
moonlight, shimmering pensively on the pavements, is like a light that shines 
for other objects and has fallen upon this wretched and ridiculous world by 
chance alone." 
In this particular, it must be confessed, the hands of the roman-. 
ticists were again strengthened by the example of Goethe, in 
spite of his superior clarity of vision and his sterner sense of 
actuality. For his own part he was never able to conceive of 
nature, in the passive sense otherwise than as a work of art or 
in the active sense otherwise than as an artist, for his pantheism 
involved the one with the other. As such it must exhibit, on 
the one hand, the same sort of design as any other artistic pro-
duct, a poem or a statue; at the same time it must proceed, on 
the other hand, in accordance with certain ideas similar to those 
which determined his own work. His investigations of nature, 
therefore, consisted in a series of attempts to explain that design 
by penetrating to the ideas behind it. In other words, the uni-
verse was an artistic illusion, whose significance resided in the 
motif which it realised-just as a novel is an illusion whose only 
principle of coherence resides in the author's conception. Prac-
tically, therefore, since it was a mere mode of artistic expression, 
the problem was to find the animating and creative ideas which 
as artist it was trying to communicate. It never occurred to 
him that it might be nothing more than a mechanical what-not-
a something which had fallen together and operated, not in 
virtue of a set of ideas, but in accordance with a set of formulre, 
that it might be something in and for itself, independent of 
consciousness and without reference to it. Hence Schiller's 
perfectly just objection to his Urpjlanze, "that is an idea, not a 
fact." In short Goethe was, in reality, not scientific, but literary. 
While art begins by assuming that nature is an illusion, science 
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begins by assuming that it is a reality. While the former 
endeavours to discover an idea that will give it significance, the 
latter endeavours to discover a formula which will express the 
manner in which it works. For this reason the mathematical 
theory of light was simple nonsense to Goethe. It was not an 
idea, a creative conception at all; it was a mere modus operandi. 
On the other hand, in those cases where our organisation of the 
universe is nothing more than the interpretations of the human 
spirit-or in those sciences which consist largely in classification, 
which are little more than arrangements of data, in accordance 
with our own notions, and in which the generalisations are in a 
sense only categories of the human intelligenc,e-in sciences like 
botany and biology he was quite at home. But even there, not-
withstanding his profounder divination, he was virtually at one 
with the romanticists. 
As a result of their exclusive and consistent egotism, when they 
came to write, they had naturally nothing to write about but 
themselves. That was all they knew, even if anything else had 
happened to interest them, as it seldom did. With one or two 
unimportant exceptions they had divorced themselves from all 
the active and practical concerns of existence. At the one end 
Tieck had disassociated poetry from life and reflection; at the 
other Schleiermacher had disassociated religion from virtue and 
morality-" everything with religion, nothing for it." Their 
forms were almost devoid of content-in short, the form was the 
content; hence the famous definition of transcendental poetry 
as the poetry of poetry and their curious doctrine of second 
powers or the multiplication of a subject into itself. The 
French Revolution alone of all the stirring historical movements 
. that were eddying around them seems to have roused them to a 
faint flutter of excitement-mainly because they saw a way to 
turn it over to the account of their own subjectivity. "The 
French Revolution, Fichte's Theory of Knowledge, and Goethe's 
Meister," declares Friedrich Schlegel, II are the greatest tendencies 
of the century." In consequence their own novels are all auto-
biographies, revamped and redated, but cribbed, cabined, and 
confined by the writers' own limited experience of themselves. 
It is so with Sternbald and Heinrich von Ofterdingen, with Lucinde 
and Hyperion. Indeed, this is Friedrich Schlegel's definition of 
the romance-an individual confession. And it is equally so 
even with their philosophies; of Schleiermacher's Monologen 
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Haym remarks: "He talks as a man would do to his most intimate 
friend." In a word, all their writings are personalities and 
indiscretions. 
It is only natural, therefore, that from the literary point of 
. view their work should be as poverty-stricken as it is. But it was 
not only so, it was muddled too. As they were puppets of mood, 
without genuine character, all impressions were indifferent. Just 
as their criticism was destitute of principles, so their creative 
work, their Dichtung, was destitute of selection. What marked 
it most conspicuously was the raw eclecticism which is the note of 
romanticism everywhereL-a seated contempt fot the discrimina-
tions of a sane and disciplined taste. Hence a mishmash of 
Inotives, costumes, cults, civilisations-Hellenism and Med-
irevalism, Paganism and Christianity-jumbled together in 
inextricable medley. In this respect the elastic dream-economy 
of Heinrich von Ofterdingen is remarkable and amply justifies by 
its conveniency the M iirchen or fairy story as the romantic type 
par excellence. All their Dichtung is essentially inchoate, as were 
the two products which served them as paradigms-Goethe's 
Meister and Tieck's Genoveva. And amid all this ferment and 
clutter only one distinctly discernible purpose-the desire of 
these young hotheads to reproduce the impressions made by life 
upon their feverish and excited imaginations. 
III 
Evidently an existence of such unremitting self-exploitation 
must have been extremely fitful and spasmodic. It must have 
had its moments of exaltation, of reckless intoxication and 
Rausch. But these moments must have been succeeded by 
intervals of deSperate reaction and disillusion. Holderlin alone 
is sufficient proof of it. As a result of this emotional insecurity, 
no doubt, originated the doctrine of Transcendental Irony. 
The title, ostentatious as it is, covers nothing more than an 
attempt, on the part of Friedrich Schlegel in the first instance, 
to pass off one's mortification at one's failings and shortcomings 
by being the first to ridicule them when they were too conspicu-
ous to escape general attention. It is a common enough shift 
in every walk of life for those who are embarrassed by the dis-
crepancy 15etween their pretensions and their performance to 
make a virtue of necessity, and by anticipating detraction and 
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taking sides against themselves, to vindicate a kind of critical 
or intellectual superiority over their own practical activities. 
In such manner the romantic ego had at least the advantage of 
appearing to know better than it could do and of restoring its 
authority by a characteristically unprofessional intrusion or 
supervention upon its own work. Like Victor Hugo's theory 
of the grotesque the transcendental irony was a tacit confession 
of the writer's powerlessness to produce a perfectly congruous and 
satisfactory piece of work and an attempt to make a merit of 
the fact by erecting his weakness into a quality. In other words 
it was an effort to insure the romantic poet against the medio-
crity of his own gifts. As Haym, who is usually so reserved in 
his strictures, remarks in another connection: "This is perhaps 
the most striking index of romantic poetry-that what is else-
where an evidence of impotence and banality [Unpoesie] it con-
strues as an indication of beauty and perfection." 
From the point of view which has been gained at present it 
is impossible to mistake the nature of the transcendental con-
ception of self engaged in these speculations-as of something 
distinct from all that is tangible, palpable, or in any way appre-
hensible or accountable. It is something quite noncommittal 
and irresponsible. I t is uncompromised by a man's actions; 
it is as evidently unprejudiced by his character; nor has it 
apparently any manifestations by which you can bring it to book. 
You can nbt comer it, try as you will. Whatever he is or does, 
no matter how bete or fatuous or futile he may be, the romanticist 
has only to reply to your censures: " Ah! you are quite mistaken; 
that is not 1. See, I have quite as much contempt for that sort 
of thing as you have." Verily, it was a dabster at evasion, this 
transcendental self. In every instance it eludes you and by a 
like expedient. It" dematerialises" like a "spirit" under your 
very eyes and leaves you gaping foolishly at vacancy. 
Upon morality the effect of such a doctrine was bound to be 
fatal. This retirement of the real man from his character and 
occupation provided a ready excuse for all sorts of irregularities, 
which could be represented as merely impertinent to the genuine 
self. By this means it was possible to excuse any atrocity as 
transcendentally irrelevant and indifferent. And as a matter of 
fact, the romanticist soon came to understand by morals nothing 
more than the uses of human nature in its laxest and most 
inclusive sense. The study of morality was the study of human-
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ity; and it was a consequence of his eclecticism that he embraced 
in the term the animal as well as the spiritual, the earthy as well 
as the ethereal. And since the ponderable, if once admitted, 
is likely to weigh the heavier in the balance, it happened more 
often than not that his morality was, in the ordinary acceptation 
of the word, very immoral indeed. In fact, Schleiermacher 
makes no bones about proclaiming "the immorality of all 
morals. " While further, as humanity is infinitely various, it 
will follow that there are as many moralities as there are human 
beings. It is again Schleiermacher who with great complacency 
makes the flattering discovery that the ego possesses a morality 
as unique as its individuality. Perhaps Lucinde is as good a map 
as we have of human nature after the romantic morality, where 
humanity is likely to display itself very much as it is. But alas 
for Schleiermacher, who went to the pains of defending it! it 
is not only a nasty book, it is also a stupid one. 
" Der Pedantismus bat die Phantasie 
Urn einen Kuss; sie wies ibn an die SUnde. 
Frech, ohne Kraft umarmt er die, 
Und sie genas von einem toten Kinde, 
Genannt Lucinde. " 
And its viciousness as well as its stupidity, like that of the school 
behind it, consists in its licentiousness, in the rejection of every 
principle of restraint or control. The conception of obligation 
as such seems never to have dawned upon this gentry. As 
Goethe said of the Schlege1s, "Unhappily both brothers lack some 
sort of inner check to hold them together an d keep them fast" 
[" Leider mangelt es beiden Briidern an einem gewissen innern 
Halt der sie zusammenhalte und festhalte "]. About their con-
duct there is always something shifty, unreliable, incalculable-
it is subject to a kind of aberration which seems to withdraw it 
from the province of morals altogether and relegate it to that of 
whim, caprice, and haphazard. It hardly belongs with the 
rational and providential at all. It very nearly substantiates 
their own claim of identity with nature. 
I t is in this respect that German romanticism differs most 
strikingly from New England transcendentalism. The parallel-
ism between the two is too close and obvious to be overlooked. 
To read Tieck is, in many cases, like reading Hawthorne trans-
lated into German, or vice versa. I am disconcerted by the 
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similarity every time I reread them. Not only is there a resem-
blance of general tone and spirit between Hawthorne's sketches 
and such stories of Tieck's in particular as the Blonde Eckbert and 
the Runenberg; but there is also a resemblance of style and treat-
ment, as is obvious from comparing the opening of The Great 
Stone Face with that of Die Freunde or Die Elfen. And so like-
wise with N ovalis and Emerson there is in both the same char-
acteristic sententious, fragmentary manner, the same brachylogy. 
And what is so amazing, is that the scholars and literary historians 
would have us believe that there was no direct discipleship on the 
part of the Yankees. But however this may be, the leading 
ideas of the two schools or movements were much the same; 
their philosophy of life was, as a philosophy, identical. What 
New England transcendentalism amounted to in the end, as we 
have had a chance to see in this generation, was, like German 
romanticism, the apotheosis of a purely ideal and sentimental 
ego above character and conduct at large, and the arbitrary 
elevation of the dicta of this ego into a code of morality. 
To be sure, Emerson was himself a man of character and he 
assumed the ego to be possessed of such character because he was. 
But it was just the weakness of Emersonianism that in its adop-
tion by others it was bound to take on the peculiarities of those 
who adopted it-and they might have character, or more fre-
quently, as it has turned out, they might not. In other words, 
there was nothing in the original doctrine to guarantee or insure 
character. And it is on this account that transcendentalism has 
again become the philosophy of an age and a country in which the 
general level of moral action is conspicuously low. It is just the 
philosophy for a race and a generation with our notions of liberty 
and self-interest-for a race and generation which wishes to be 
free to defraud its neighbours in the morning and boast of its 
moral elevation in the evening. It affords a sentimental refuge 
for self-esteem in any emergency. It enables us in the handiest 
way in the world to redeem the baseness of our practice by the 
nobility of our sentiments. No matter how low our behaviour, 
how contemptible our acts, our genuine self remains untouched. 
Herein lies the explanation of the curious anomalies of our civil-
. isation--our unscrupulous and oppressive money-getting on the 
one hand and our ostentatious and munificent benevolence on 
the other; our sordid living and our grandiose dec1amation-
the morose might call it hypocrisy; we call it idealism. 
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To make Emerson and the romanticists responsible for all these 
consequences seems at first thought unfair. In his own case 
there is present one idea whose absence is thoroughly indicative 
of the German transcendentalists as well as of contemporary 
idealists. Emerson was still animated by a sense of duty. 
Whether it was a survival of his descent or an independent ac-
quirement of his own, the consciousness of responsibility and 
guilt had not yet faded from his mind. Though. this conception 
does not appear explicitly in his work, perhaps, it was implicit 
in his character. It is virtually taken for granted, even though 
it may never be mentioned; and it is in this particular that his 
utterances have an immeasurable superiority over those of the 
Germans. The transcendental idea of liberty had succeeded in 
retrenching the categorical imperative altogether. Liberty con-
sisted in following your own bent. Whatever gave the self range 
and opportunity was moral. In short, morality was egotism. 
Into this error Emerson never slipped. But it u!u.st be remem-
bered that it was romanticism pure and simple that he preached; 
and that in preaching it at all, he is justly accountable for the 
results. 
In other respects Hinduism, too, offers an edifying contrast 
with transcendentalism. In one sense they were both systems of 
the ego. While the latter, however, is optimistic, the former, on 
the contrary, is pessimistic. It all lies in that. The note of ro-
manticism is ec1ecticism-indifferency, promiscuity. The note 
of Buddhism is discrimination, distinction, reservation. What 
saves Buddhism, in short, is its dualism; that is, its freedom from 
confusion. To the transcendentalist nature was but an exten-
sion of the ego; human nature was but" sister to the mountain " 
and "second cousin to the worm"; the insensate was but an 
alter ego of consciousness. To the Hindu nature was a derogation 
to the genuine self. And with nature we must understand all 
that part of human nature which was liable to "natural" law. 
Hence liberty for the Buddhist lay in the self-restraint which 
enabled him to withdraw more and more from the influence of 
the fleeting, the impermanent, and the earthy until he should 
emancipate himself wholly from the law for thing, the mechanical 
determinations of a material cosmos, and ensue the higher and 
spiritual, the true self. Whereas Hinduism would make religion 
consist in a recognition of the distinction between the eternal 
and the impermanent, the one and the many, and in an effort 
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to establish the former; romanticism in the person of its evangel-
ist, Schleiermacher, would find the infinite everywhere and in 
everything and would swallow up both the one and the many in a 
miscellaneous all. "The meditation of the pious is only an im-
mediate consciousness of the universal, of all that is finite in 
the infinite and through the infinite, of all that is temporal in 
the eternal and through the eternal. To seek and find this 
in everything that lives and moves, in all that grows and changes, 
in all that acts and suffers, and to have and know life itself only in 
immediate feeling as this being-this is religion." An illimit-
able diffusion, a boundless dissipation, an unceasing flux of sen-
sation and emotion in which all distinction and definition melt 
away in a shifty confusion-such is the last word of the romantic 
religion as it is of the romantic ethics-endless dissolution. 
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